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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS B. COVINGTON, ]
by and through its Co-Personal
Representatives, Robert H.
Covington and Mary C. Whetman,
)

P E T I T I O N FOR REHEARING

Plaintiffs and Appellees,
vs.
Case No. 930371CA
JOHN C. JOSEPHSON and GERALDINE C.
JOSEPHSON,

])

Priority

(15)

Defendants and Appellants. ]
Defendants and Appellants, John C. Josephson and Geraldine C.
Josephson,

(hereinafter

"defendants"),

by

and

through

their

attorney of record, Gordon A. Madsen, hereby petition for rehearing
pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH
Gordon A. Madsen, attorney of record for plaintiff, hereby
certifies that this petition is present in good faith and not for
delay.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The opinion of the Court of Appeals was filed December 22,
1994.

This petition for rehearing has therefore been timely served

and filed.
STATEMENT OF POINTS OF LAW OR FACT WHICH PLAINTIFF CLAIMS
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED
POINT 1.
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
CONTRADICTS ITSELF ON THE ISSUE OF UNPAID TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS AND
LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT SAID ISSUE COULD AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN

TRIED IN THE ORIGINAL ACTION BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND IS THEREFORE
PRECLUDED IN THE SECOND ACTION.
The decision of the Court of Appeals at page 5 states in
substance that the issues of unpaid taxes and assessments did not
have to be raised by plaintiff in the prior action between the
parties because said claims "were not ripe."
Notwithstanding that conclusion, at page 7 of the said
decision the Court of Appeals states that "The fact that some taxes
and assessments were due and owing at the time of the Judgment is
a strong indication that the District Court's ruling did not
terminate the Contract, but rather was limited to the issues
discussed." (Emphasis added.)
We believe these statements are inconsistent.

If the

taxes were due and owing then the claim that defendants owed them
was indeed ripe, and could and should have been raised in the first
action.

Accordingly the trial courts determination in the first

action that the contract "was paid in full"

must be construed to

mean that it was paid in full as to all matters that could or
should have been brought before it at that time, and that of
necessity includes the claims asserted by plaintiffs in the second
case.
POINT 2.
MATTERS

RAISED

THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS MISAPPREHENDED THAT

IN POST-JUDGMENT MOTION ARE

NOT

BARRED

FROM

APPELLATE REVIEW WHERE THEY DO NOT RELATE TO EVIDENTIARY MATTERS.
The Court of Appeals rules in this action that raising an

2

issue in a motion to alter and amend does not preserve it for
appellate review, unless in effect the lower court makes it the
subject of an evidentiary hearing.

If there is such a rule, it

certainly cannot be applicable in a summary judgment case.

By

definition we are never going to be dealing with an evidentiary
hearing on a motion for summary judgment.

The only justification

for a rule that a matter first raised in a motion for a new trial
or to alter and amend should not be reviewable on appeal is that it
should have been raised during the evidentiary hearing when the
court could have corrected the error.

This will only occur in

proceedings which are not limited to legal issues.
That reason for the rule does not exist in summary
judgment proceedings and therefore the rule does not exist. We are
dealing in this action with a summary judgment, which means the
court is dealing with questions of law and not with evidence. At
page 6 of the opinion in this case, the Court of Appeals cites the
case of Bar son v. E.R. Squibb & Sons. Inc., 682 P2d 832, (Utah
1984). That case involved a belated objection relating to evidence
in a jury trial.

It had nothing to do with an issue of law.

All

of the other cases cited on page 6 of the opinion under the hearing
"Termination of Contract" likewise deal with issues that should
have been raised during trials. They have nothing to do with legal
issues being considered in a motion for summary judgment.

The

Court of Appeals states in note 5 of the opinion in this case:
"The trial court did not take evidence or hold an evidentiary
3

hearing on the issue, but instead simply denied the Motion to Alter
or Amend."

This statement entirely begs the question and is

without meaning.

This is a motion for summary judgment so of

course there was no evidentiary hearing.
It appears to be well established that appellate courts
can properly consider legal arguments which are first raised on
appeal.

If this is so how much more can they consider legal

matters raised in post judgment motions. We cite to the court from
5 Am. Jur. Appeal and Error, Sec. 546:2
"...However, an exception to the general rule has been
made in some cases where the newly advanced theory
involves only a question of law arising upon the proved
or admitted facts, and is finally determinative of the
case. Judgments have been sustained in such cases upon
a theory not asserted or urged below upon the ground that
the same result would necessarily be reached upon a new
trial, if granted. The rule requiring adherence to the
theory relied on below does not mean that the parties are
limited in the appellate court to the same reasons or
arguments advance in the lower court upon the matter or
question in issue..." (Emphasis added.)
Defendants clearly asserted that the uniform real estate
contract could not sustain plaintiffs7 claims, and were at liberty
to assert any and all reasons available in support of their
position.
The opinion of the court of appeals states by way of
dicta

that

even

if the

issue had

been

properly

preserved,

defendants would fail anyway because in effect "paid in full" does
not mean paid in full, but for the reasons stated in Point 2 above
defendants respectfully submit that those words must be construed

&

to mean what they say.
POINT 3.

THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS MISAPPREHENDED THE

STATUS OF PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT FOR ATTORNEY FEES, AND THE ISSUE OF
THE REASONABLENESS

OF ATTORNEY

FEES REQUIRES AN

EVIDENTIARY

HEARING.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is to the effect that
defendants did not contest the affidavit of plaintiff's attorney
regarding attorney fees.
The Court of Appeals fails to note that the affidavit of
Mr. Broadbent regarding attorney fees was not filed as part of the
motion for summary judgment and therefore no counter affidavit was
possible or required.

It its ruling on January 4, 1993, the court

directed as part of its memorandum decision that:
"Plaintiffs attorney to prepare affidavit for attorney fees
"Objection to be filed in 10 days"
The affidavit was served on January 22, 1993, and filed
on January 25, 1993.

(See Docket in Addendum to Reply Brief of

Appellant and Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment at R. 105.)
Defendants objected thereto by serving Motion to Alter and Amend
and Memorandum on February 4, 1993, and the same were filed on Feb.
5, 1993.

Although the Docket shows these documents to have been

filed, the clerk's office somehow lost them, and these documents
were

added

to

the

record

by

stipulation

of

the

parties.

Notwithstanding the timely filing of said documents as an objection
to the entire proposed summary judgment including the attorney fee
5

portion thereof, Judge Reese entered Summary Judgment on Feb. 10,
without an evidentiary hearing as required by Provo City Corp. V.
Cropper 28 Utah 2d 1, 497 P.2d 629 (1972). It should be noted that
the said case of Provo City Corp. v. Cropper holds that an
evidentiary
otherwise."

hearing

is

necessary

"unless

the

parties

agree

There was no agreement by the parties that attorney

fees be handled by affidavit. Without an evidentiary hearing there
is no way that defendants can determine how many hours were spent
on this case by plaintiff's counsel.

There is no way that

defendants can file an affidavit to contract plaintiff^s asserted
facts.

That can only be done with an evidentiary hearing where

cross examination is possible.
POINT 4.

THE COURT OF APPEALS IMPROPERLY FAILED TO

ADDRESS THE ISSUES OF COLLATERAL ATTACK AND EXISTENCE OF ISSUE OF
FACT.
The court of appeals should have dealt with these issues,
but erroneously declined to do so. The issues as developed in the
two briefs filed by defendants herein were proper and substantial
issues and should have addressed by the court and should have been
ruled upon in favor of defendants for the reasons set forth in said
briefs by defendants.
Defendants will not repeat those arguments herein except
as to the issue of the supposed representation that the issue of
taxes and assessments was to be excluded from the trial.
On motion for summary judgment, all inferences are to be
6

construed in favor of the party moved against.

The Court of

Appeals refers to the affidavit of Mary Whetman
affidavit of plaintiff's counsel, David Broadbent.
asserts in her affidavit:

"8.

and to the
Mrs. Whetman

During the trial before Judge

Moffat regarding the right-of-way claimed by the Josephsons across
our property, Mr. Cummings,their attorney, represented to us and to
the court that the Josephsons would pay any taxes and water
assessments which were due on their parcel, as they had previously
paid since 1973 throughout the course of our contract with them."
(Emphasis added.

See R. 75, and Ex. B in Addendum of Brief of

Appellees.)
David K. Broadbent in his affidavit stated that on
"several occasions prior to trial...and on at least one occasion
during the trial, Mr. Cummmings, their attorney, represented to me
and to the court that the Josephsons would pay any taxes and water
assessments which were due on their parcel. He stated to the court
(and the Covingtons and their counsel agreed) that the case before
the court was to determine the existence of the right-of-way which
was the subject of the action."

(Emphasis added.

See R. 63 and

Ex. G in Addendum of Brief of Appellees.)
Both plaintiff, Whetman, and her attorney Mr. Broadbent
themselves admit that such taxes were due at the time of the trial.
(See Point 1 above.)

Mrs. Whetman makes no claim that Cummings

made any representation before the trial, and Mr. Broadbent who
claims

that

he

did,

does

not
7

assert

that

the

claimed

representations
himself.

before trial were agreed

to by plaintiff

or

He only claims that the representation at the trial was

agreed to by plaintiff and himself.

Where he does not make the

same claim as to the other so-called representations the inference
is that any such representations were not agreed to nor relied upon
by plaintiffs or himself.

Nowhere in his affidavit does he claim

reliance on any such representation. Defendant Josephson in making
his affidavit thought he was fairly meeting the assertions of Mr.
Broadbent and Mrs. Whetman. Under these facts to rule that denial
of a stipulation is not a denial of a representation is not fair
and flies in the face of the rule that summary judgment is proper
only if the party moved against cannot recover upon any theory
reasonably claimed by such party.

Even plaintiffs did not claim

such a narrow and unreasonable interpretation.

Josephson has

clearly stated in good faith facts which raise a bona fide issue of
fact.

Surely, a sense of fairness dictates that Mr. Josephsons

affidavit must be construed to have created a factual issue on this
matter.
POINT 5. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING DEFENDANT ORAL
ARGUMENT.
Defendant's counsel did not receive notice of the hearing
of this matter, as set forth in the affidavit of defendants'
counsel filed herein when counsel learned of this error.

Failure

to give such oral argument to defendant when such was allowed to
plaintiff constitutes a denial of due process.
8

CONCLUSION
For the reasons therefore that the court has created an
unworkable rule and because a great injustice has been done to the
plaintiff, we respectfully request that this petition for rehearing
be granted.
Respectfully submitted,

jfi
GORDON A. MADSEN
Attorney for the Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Two copies of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing were
mailed to

David K. Broadbent, attorney for the plaintiffs and

appellees, at his address, City Centre I, Suite 900, 175 East
Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah, postage prepaid, this

^

day of January, 199S7~"

/%/

Attorney for the Defendants
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